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By Albert Feuerwerker*
* Albert Feuerwerker acted as Chairman of the
conference described in this article. He is Pro-
fessor of History and Director of the Center for
Chinese Studies, University of Michigan. He is
the author of China’s Early Industrialization : 
Sheng Hsuan-Huai (1844-1916) and Mandarine
Enterprise and co-author of Chinese Commu-
nist Studies of Modern Chinese history.
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China in 1949, a vast outpouring of historical
writing-in books, periodicals, and the cultural
pages of newspapers-has flowed from the research
institutes and universities of Peking, Shanghai,
and elsewhere. In spite of sometimes considera-
ble difficulties in obtaining current publications
from China, a significant part of this flood has
reached the libraries of Japan, Europe, and America,
where in recent years work on the history of China
has seen a remarkable growth. It is inevitable
that non-Chinese scholars of Chinese civilisation
will have to take into account the new historiogra-
phy emanating from Communist China.
To examine and evaluate historical writing in
China under the Communist regime some thirty
specialists on Chinese history from the United
States, England, Europe, Japan, Australia, and
Malaya met at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, from
6-12 September, 1964. The conference was spon-
sored by The China Quarterly. The plans for the
discussions grew out of an earlier conference
which that journal had sponsored on Chinese
Communist Literature.
It was apparent from the papers and the lively
discussions which they occasioned that the writing
of history in China continues to occupy under the
present regime, as under its predecessors over
more than two millenia, a critical place among the
preoccupations of the ruling strata. From its be-
ginnings, the writing of history in China has been
intimately associated with the politics of the
Chinese state...as a justification for bold depar-
tures which, it was claimed, were merely restoring
the &dquo;golden age&dquo; of the great sages of the past, as
a means of legitimising the succession of one rul-
ing group to the throne of its predecessor, as a
powerful weapon in the struggles of factions and
cliques over the centuries. Like its predecessors
the government of the People’s Republic of China
has been acutely aware of the political uses of his-
tory, and since coming to power in 1949 it has
vigourously promoted the rewriting of the Chinese
past.
The Chinese Communist reinterpretation of
China’s history has, in considerable part, been
offered as propaganda designed to perpetuate
support of the present regime among the Chinese
people. But there is something more to it than
this. Historical writing in China today, as viewed
by her nation’s leaders, represents a genuine
attempt to find legitimisation in China’s past for
the developments of her most recent present. For
the Confucian ideology of imperial China, the Com-
munist government in Peking has, of course,
substituted a still developing Maoist version of
Marxism-Leninism as the touchstone for the as-
sessment of the past. But it would be misleading
to suppose that what was peculiarly Chinese, either
in motivation or in substance, has been totally
expunged from the historiography of China by the
Communist revolution.
The conference discussions addressed them-
selves to three major questions :
1. What was the substantive value of Chinese
historical writing since 1949 in the various fields
in which the conference participants were in-
terested ? What new data or interpretations
had been presented, and how should they be
evaluated ?
2. What are the main characteristics of historical
theory, method, and the organisation of teaching
and research in China today ; and how do they
differ from the past ?
3. What connections were there between the con-
tent and form of post 1949 historical writing and
the domestic policies and international relations
of the Chinese Communist regime ? What light
does an analysis of Chinese Communist histo-
riography throw on Chinese Communist society
today ?
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With respect to the first of these questions, the
participants agreed that the picture was a mixed
one. In spite of the tremendous outpouring of
historical works since 1949, there were huge arears
of the past which, for political and ideological
reasons and because of limited trained manpower,
the Chinese historians had barely touched. It was
noted, for example, that until quite recent!y the
overwhelming emphasis of historical research had
been placed either on the pre-Han period or on the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This left a
2000-year gap which was indiscriminately labelled
&dquo;feudal&dquo; and which received relatively little atten-
tion. Even for those periods on which more work
had been done, the Chinese historians tended to
restrict themselves to a limited number of topics
more or less directly related to the problem of
constructing a new past to replace the discarded
Confucian-literati raiment : periodisation (e.g. when
did the era of slavery end and that of feudalism
begin ?), the interpretation of peasant rebellions,
the formation of the Han nation, the nature of
landholding in &dquo;feudal&dquo; China, the controversy over
the origins of capitalism in China, and the role of
&dquo;imperialism&dquo; in modern Chinese history. It was
agreed that among the several subfields of history,
work in archaeology was generally of a higher order
of excellence and more free of political distortions
than work done in other fields. Little new of inter-
pretive value had resulted from recent treatments
of China’s traditional history, and a fortiori of
modern Chinese history. But, especially in the
modern field, the large-scale publication of generally
well-edited source material was a boon to scholars
of China everywhere.
On the second question, continuities and diver-
gencies between traditional and Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist historiography were noted ; and particular
attention was given to the manner in which the
Marxist materialist conception of history had taken
on a special Maoist Chinese form which diverged
considerably from classical Marxism. Probably be-
cause the information available is so inadequate,
the conference participants generally felt that the
discussions on the organisation of historical studies
in China today, and the working conditions (mate-
rial and ideological-political) of practising histo-
rians, were the least satisfactory.
With respect to the last question, the conference
discussed the effects of the &dquo;Hundred Flowers&dquo;
interlude and the subsequent anti-rightist campaign,
upon historiography in China. A good deal of
attention was paid to the growing nationalist flavour
of Chinese historical work since about 1959, and
this, it was felt, could be directly correlated with
the widening Sino-Soviet rift. There was consider-
able discussion of what the effects of this nationa-
list turn would be upon the treatment of that part
of the past which had once been rejected out of
hand as &dquo;feudal&dquo;. It appeared that some feudal
despots, at least, were gradually being transformed
into national heroes. This kind of reinterpretation,
however, conceivably could be troublesome if
carried loo far, as it tends to undermine the &dquo;class
viewpoint&dquo; so vigorously pushed in other connec-
tions by the Chinese Communist leadership.
The papers presented at the conference will be
published by The China Quarterly in the course of
the next year.
&dquo;The weapon is an important factor in war, but it is not the decisive factor. The
decisive factor is man and not material. A comparison of strength means more than a
comparison of military strength and economic strength. It is also a comparison of
manpower resources and the hearts of the people. Military strength and economic
strength have to be manned.&dquo; (On Protracted War, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2,
p. 459).
On the one hand, we must see that nuclear weapons and guided missiles are weapons
of great power, and we must march in the direction of science and technology and exert
our utmost effort to scale the peaks of science and technology and catch up with and
surpass the most developed imperialist countries. On the other hand, we must see even
more that no matter how powerful a new-type weapon may be, it will never change the
truth that &dquo;the militia is the foundation of victory.&dquo; While atom bombs are very powerful,
spiritual atom bombs are a thousand times more so. By spiritual atom bombs, we mean
the just nature of our war against aggression, the indignation of hundreds of millions of
people, and their heroic and dogged fighting spirit......With the support of the masses of
the people, we are in the most superior position. We have now mastered material atom
bombs, but the enemy will never be able to obtain spiritual atom bombs.
Liu Yun-Chen in Jen-min’Jih-pao, November, 18, 1964.
